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Abstract
In this paper we present a differential attack on the block cipher PP-1 which was designed
at Poznan University of Technology. Complexity of the attack is smaller than that of brute
force attack for every version of the cipher (for every block length). The attack is possible is
spite of the fact that the S-box exhibits optimal security against the differential cryptanalysis.
The attack is based on the fact that the design of the cipher S-box and permutation were
constructed independently. The permutation operates on individual bits, and in the XOR
profile table of S-box 1 bit to 1 bit transitions are possible. It allows constructing a simple
one-round differential characteristic which is ”almost” iterative with the probability 1.5 · 2−6.
By 9 times concatenation of the characteristic and its relaxation in the last round we ob-
tained a 10-round characteristic with the probability 2-48.7. Using this characteristic with 1R
attack makes differential cryptanalysis of full 11-round cipher with complexity smaller than
exhaustive search possible. By carefully exploiting similar characteristics it is possible to find
analogous attacks on different versions of cipher PP-1, with higher a larger of rounds.
1. Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis [1] is, next to linear cryptanalysis [2, 3] and alge-
braic attacks [4] one of three fundamental, general methods of cryptanalysis of
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block ciphers [5]. This method has been known since 90’ and modern block
ciphers should be invulnerable to it. However, some new block ciphers are
vulnerable to this attack, for example Q cipher [6, 7]. The aim of the paper
is to show that even completely new designed block ciphers can be attacked
with differential cryptanalysis if they are not carefully constructed. The flaw of
PP-1 cipher attacked here is an independent design of nonlinear layer (S-boxes)
and linear layer (permutation). Applied permutation operates on individual
bits, but independently designed involutional S-box shows in its XOR profile
that differential transitions with only one active bit on input to one active
bit on output are possible. It means that diffusion in the cipher is quite poor.
This observation allows finding differential characteristics with one active S-box
in every round. Concatenation of three one-round iterative characteristics with
the probability 2−7 each allows constructing almost iterative characteristic with
the probability 1.5 · 2−6. Extension of the iterative characteristic to 9 rounds
and extra extension with the last round allows finding a 10-round differential
characteristic with the probability 2−48.7. This characteristic can be used in 1R
attack on the full 11-round version of the cipher with complexity lower than
exhaustive search complexity 264. Its extension to 21, 31 and 42 rounds allows
attacking the cipher with the block length 128, 192 and 256 bits respectively,
as well. Some preliminary results on iterative differential cryptanalysis of the
most basic version of PP-1 cipher are presented in [8]. In this paper we extend
these early results to actual attacks on the full PP-1 cipher.
PP-1 cipher was designed at Poznan University of Technology (name is de-
rived from Poznań Politechnique - in Polish) in 2007 [9, 10]. The first version
of PP-1 has the block length of 64 bits, then also a version with a scalable
block length which is a multiple of 64 bits was developed. The special fea-
ture of the cipher is, according to the authors that it is an involutional SPN
(substitution-permutation network). More detailed description of the cipher is
given in Section 2. In Section 3 we present four one-round, iterative differential
characteristics, and a method to concatenate two of them to construct an almost
iterative characteristic. In Section 4 we give method of extension this one-round
characteristic to 10 rounds, and also some improvements of the method. In Sec-
tion 5 we present differential attack on PP-1 cipher with 11 rounds which uses
the characteristic. Section 6 gives some conclusions, in which we discuss the
security of PP-1 cipher with bigger number of rounds.
2. Description of PP-1 cipher
The PP-1 cipher was designed at Poznan University of Technology [9, 10].
It allows encryption of plaintexts of the length being an arbitrary multiplicity
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of 64 bits. The cipher is involutional SPN (substitution-permutation network).
It means that, non-linear layer (S-boxes) as well as linear (permutation) are
involutions and may be used for encryption and decryption. The non-linear
layer is presented in Fig. 1.
The non-linear layer transforms the 64-bit input block to the same length
output block with a twice longer key (128-bit round key). It uses the operations:
XOR, arithmetic sum and subtraction (see Fig. 1) and involutional S-box S of
the size 8 8 bits. For the versions of PP-1 with the block length of multiplicity
of 64 bits, the non-linear layer is used in parallel for each 64-bit input block
and requires the round key to be twice longer than the block length.
Fig. 1. Scheme of non-linear layer of PP-1 cipher.
After the non-linear layer in the PP-1 cipher linear (involutional again) op-
eration is applied. It is a permutation P which operates with the full length
of the block. The permutation for the version with 64-bit block is presented in
Table 1. Odd rows in the table give subsequently input bits, and under them
(even rows) positions on which the input bits goes in output. So, according to
the table the first bit goes to position 10, the second to 15, and so on.
In order to show the influence of permutation P on the dependencies between
output bits of non-linear layer of one round and input bits to non-linear layer
of next round the permutation P is presented in the following, equivalent way
(Table 2).
Subsequent input bytes to permutation P are written in rows and denoted
with the letters from a to h. They correspond to output bytes to subsequent S-
boxes of non-linear layer (a - the output form first S-box, b - the second, and so
on). Bits in those bytes are denoted with the digits from 1 to 8. Bit a1 denotes
the first output bit from the first S-box and goes to (according to Table 2.) bit
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Table 1. Permutation P as PP-1 cipher for the block length n = 64.
Table 2. Permutation P in tables of the size 8× 8 bits (n = 64).
b2, which means the second input bit to second S-box in the next round, which
is 10th output bit from permutation P . It is consistent with Table 1.
One can see that every row of input table is transformed by permutation
P into only two different columns of output table. This fact will not be used
directly in the differential attack described below, but it cannot be considered
as an advantage of the permutation. It is rather a flaw, because input bits are
permuted in a schematic way and not optimally diffused. But the main flaw
of the permutation, applied in the attack is the fact that the output bits from
one S-box may go to input bits of the same S-box, for example c3 to c4 and
inversely (involution), similarly e6 to e7, f1 to f6 and h5 to h8.
For the versions of the cipher with a longer block length the permutation P is
defined by a special dedicated algorithm [9, 10]. The algorithm is supposed to
provide similar properties for permutation of bits in blocks of arbitrary length
(multiplicity of 64 bits), and should provide also the involution property.
In this paper we omit the detailed description of this algorithm, and study
directly the relevant permutations obtained with this algorithm for the three
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principal block sizes of 64, 128 and 256 bits relevant to the three main versions
of PP-1 cipher. These are given in Table 3 through Table 5 together with some
observations shown in bold which are relevant to our attacks.
Table 3. Permutation P for the tables of the size 8× 8 bits (n = 128).
Table 4. Permutation P for the tables of the size 8× 8 bits (n = 192).
We observe that both permutations P for bigger block lengths have one
property which is the same as in the 64-bit version from Table 10. In all cases,
the last S-box fifth bit is exchanged with the eighth bit, which is marked in the
above tables in bold.
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Table 5. Permutation P for the tables of the size 8× 8 bits (n = 256).
This property of two bits of the last S-box being mapped to the same two bits
of the same S-box in the same round is systematically exploited in our attacks
on different versions of PP-1.
The PP-1 cipher is an iterative which alternates the non-linear layer and
a (linear) permutation P. These two transformations form one round of the
cipher and are performed many times. The number of repetitions or rounds
depends on the block length. Numbers of rounds for different versions of cipher
are shown in Table 6. Block lengths are not limited to the values 256 bits, as
we mentioned before the PP-1 cipher may operate on the block lengths being
an arbitrary (finite) multiplicities of 64 bits. Specific versions with the blocks
longer than 256 bits have not been yet specified and are therefore outside the
scope of this work.
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Table 6. Number of rounds of PP-1 cipher for different block lengths.
The length of the key used in the cipher is equal to that of block or it is
twice longer [10]. In our attack we assume that the key length is equal to the
block length. We omit the discussion of these twice longer keys as our attacks
will have a similar complexity which will therefore be much lower than the
exhaustive search.
3. One-round, almost iterative differential characteristic
As already mentioned the main observation used in the differential attack on
the PP-1 cipher was the fact that non-linear and linear layers of the cipher were
designed without consideration of how they will work together. The main flaw
of the cipher is composition of bit permutation and S-box, in which one-bit to
one-bit transitions are possible. A second flaw we will exploit is the possibility
of transformation in permutation P of individual bits without change of S-box
(see bits marked in bold in Tables 2–5). These properties allow to find a one-
round iterative characteristic, or even several such characteristics with the same
probability, and then combining three of them to form an ”almost” iterative
characteristic with higher probability.
The base of each differential attack is a construction of XOR profile for S-
box(es) [1, 9, 6, 11, 5]. The S-box used in the PP-1 cipher was not selected
randomly, but it was constructed to be an involution and possibly most resistant
to differential and linear cryptanalysis. From theory [12, 13] we know, that
the S-box of the size 8 × 8 bits which is a permutation (especially involution)
in the best case must have the smallest maximum 4 in XOR profile (in paper
[9] this parameter is called maxTD). It means that the probability of a non-
trivial transition could be at most 4/28 = 2−6. Greater values should not
appear in the XOR profile. Now the case with the S-box maximally resistant
to differential attack is dealt with in the PP-1 cipher. In the XOR profile which
is not entirely presented here due to its size, one can find only entries (except
the trivial transition (0 → 0)) 4, 2 and 0. In spite of the fact that the S-box
of PP-1 cipher is optimal i.e. maximally resistant to differential attack, its
combination with permutation P allows such an attack. The reason is the fact
mentioned earlier that in the S-box one-bit transitions are possible. The XOR
profile restricted to only one-bit transitions is presented in Table 7.
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Table 7. Distribution of one-bit transitions in the S-box from PP-1.
As we can see from the above table, several one-bit transitions are possible,
but none of them has the maximum value in the entire XOR profile which is
4. It means that certain one-bit transitions for example transition of 00000012
(01hex) to 00000012 (01hex) occurs with the probability 2/2
8 = 2−7 which is
slightly lower than the maximum probability 2−6.
We are especially interested in those S-boxes in which input and output
are combined with the round key by the XOR operation, these are S-boxes a,
c, f and h (see Fig. 1). For other S-boxes the round key is combined by the
operations of arithmetic sum or subtraction. These operations in the differential
attack based on the differential (linear) operation of XOR are non-linear and
must be analysed like other non-linear operations for example S-boxes. It is
possible to analyse transitions of these arithmetic operations only for the most
significant bits, because these bits behave as for the XOR operation. This
diminishes our possibilities of analysis to some extent. So, we focus only on the
S-boxes a, c, f and h. For one of them, we search such one-bit transition (see
Table 7), for which permutation P does not activate in the next round S-boxes
which do not belong to our required set of S-boxes a, c, f and h. For that
purpose the most convenient way is to use these bits in permutation P , which
does not change the S-box in the next round. These are transition of c3 to c4,
e6 to e7, f1 to f6 or h5 to h8, as well as their inversions. As follows from the
above we must reject at once transition of e6 to e7, because the S-box e (fifth)
is ”surrounded” with arithmetic operations. Of the other three transitions only
those of the fifth bit (08hex) to the eighth bit (01hex) and opposite, for the
eighth S-box h are possible (according to Table 1). Therefore we obtain two
similar (we call them involutional symmetric) one-round iterative differential
characteristics presented in Table 8.
By using the above transitions of permutation P which does not change the
S-box (these are transitions of c3 to c4, f1 to f6 or h5 to h8) we can also
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Table 8. One-round, iterative differential characteristics (with one bit).
find one-round iterative two-bit differential characteristics. The bits c3 and
c4 fixed to 1 form the byte 30hex, but differential transition 30 → 30 is not
possible in the analysed S-box. However, the bits f1 and f6 form the byte
84hex, the bits h5 and h8 form the byte 09hex, and these transitions 84 → 84
and 09 → 09 respectively are possible in the analysed S-box, both of them
again with the probability 2−7. That observation gives us two more one-round
iterative characteristics collected in Table 9.
Table 9. One-round, iterative differential characteristics (with two bits).
The main advantage of these characteristics is the fact, that they are iterative
and can be concatenated an arbitrary number of times of course with the cost of
multiplying the probability. A disadvantage of these characteristics is, however,
the fact that they do not exploit the best differential transitions of the S-
box with the probability 2−6. It would be especially important in iterating
(concatenating) these characteristics for many rounds. Such transitions with
the maximal probability, which could be used in a similar way, have not been
found.
To improve the probability of one-round characteristic we can use already
mentioned property of ”involutional symmetry” of our first two characteristics
(Table 8), the second two-bit characteristic in Table 9 and extra one-bit transi-
tions from the XOR profile of the S-box (Table 7). Namely, there is no problem
if in the S-box h differential input 01 goes to output 01 or 09, differential input
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08 goes to output 08 or 09, and differential input 09 goes to output 01 or 08.
Such transitions are possible with the probability 2−7 (see Table 7 and the XOR
profile of the S-box). In that way the first characteristic in Table 8 becomes
the second in that table or the second in Table 9 or vice-versa. Thus we obtain
one-round almost iterative characteristic (analogous to those from the attack
on Q cipher [7]) illustrated in Table 10.
Table 10. One-round, almost iterative differential characteristic.
The probability of the above characteristic is 3 · 2−7 = 1.5 · 2−6, since we
allow transitions of 01 to 08 or 01 or 09, similarly 08 to 01 or 08 or 09 and
09 to 01 or 08 or 09. It is an almost iterative characteristic, since output does
not have to be the same as input, but it can be concatenated for an arbitrary
number of rounds. The term ’almost iterative’ comes from the conclusions of
paper [7]. A similar technique is used for the GOST cipher [14]. In that paper
the authors have called this technique ’a set of differential characteristics’. A
detailed discussion about the terminology related to the sets of differentials
used in our attacks on PP-1, compared to the sets which occur in attacks on
other ciphers, for example for the Russian GOST cipher, can be found in [8].
4. Extension of characteristic to 10 rounds
Extension by repetition (concatenation) of the above almost iterative differ-





= 2−54.15 which means that it can be used for 1R at-
tack on the cipher with the block length of 64 bits. But, in the last round
we would have only one active S-box, which allows to recover only one byte of
the last round key. In order to find more parts of the last round key we can
construct different characteristics with, which is important, higher probability.
Namely, we can relax the above characteristic in the last round. It will
increase its probability because in the last round we allow transition to the ar-
bitrary (with the probability 1) output. Let us recall here once more (Table 11)
permutation P for the tables of the size 8× 8 bits which illustrates the depen-
dencies between input bits and output bits of individual S-boxes (Table 2). If
we focus the on S-box h we can see (based on the fact emphasized earlier), that
after permutation P the bits of S-box h appear as outputs only in the fifth and
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eighth columns. Moreover, we can see that these bits do not appear in the third
and fifth rows (value in bold in Table 11).
Table 11. Permutation P for the tables of the size 8× 8 bits (n = 64).
Thus we can observe that if only S-box h is active, then after permutation P
in the next round six S-boxes can be active (all except the third and the fifth
ones), and these active S-boxes will have one or two active bits (only on the fifth
and/or eighth bit) (according to Table 11). It means that if we assume that
in one before last round S-box h is active, and in the last round transition in
the S-box is arbitrary (with the probability 1), then after permutation P in the
last round at most six S-boxes could be active, and these active S-boxes would
have only one or two active bits in input. Such relaxation of the characteristic
with the active S-box h is presented in Table 12.
Table 12. One (final)-round extension of characteristic.
XX means here an arbitrary value, for which in rows 01, 08 or 09 of the
XOR profile we have an entry different from 0. From the set of 8 bits before
permutation P from one to eight bits could be active. Moreover, in the next
round for the S-boxes a, b and g if respective one bit is inactive, then the entire
S-box is inactive. S-boxes c and e are always inactive.
After nine concatenations of almost iterative characteristic (from Table 13)
and after concatenation with the final characteristic (Table 12) we get 10-round
differential characteristic of PP-1 cipher with the probability 2−48.7. The full
10-round characteristic used in the attack on 11 rounds of PP-1 is shown in
Table 13.
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Table 13. 10-round differential characteristic of PP-1 cipher with the probability
2−48.7.
Iterative characteristic from the first part is repeated 9 times.
5. Attack on 64-bit version (11 rounds)
Differential attack on 11 rounds of PP-1 is now possible with the characteristic
given in Table 13 in the following way. First we construct a set of plaintexts
whose difference on the eighth byte is equal to 01, 08 or 09. To reduce the
number of plaintexts used, we use a dedicated structure called quartet [1]. We
begin with a randomly chosen plaintext M1, and then the next three plaintexts
are determined in the following way:
M2 = M1 ⊕ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
M3 = M1 ⊕ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08
M4 = M1 ⊕ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09.
These four plaintexts give us six pairs, two pairs with each value from our
characteristic, since:
M1 ⊕M2 = M3 ⊕M4 = 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
M1 ⊕M3 = M2 ⊕M4 = 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08
M3 ⊕M2 = M1 ⊕M4 = 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09.
By encrypting only four plaintexts, we get six pairs with a required input dif-
ference. If we wanted to get these pairs in a standard way, we would have to
generate and encrypt 12 plaintexts. Using these structures reduces complexity
of our attack three times.
We encrypt the structure with a full, 11-round version of PP-1, using the
same key (a chosen plaintext attack). In this way we get four ciphertexts. At
the beginning we permute each of the ciphertexts with an inverse P permutation
(which is equal to permutation P , being an involution). What we get are blocks
after the last non-linear layer. We search among them for the pairs which follow
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our characteristic. The first condition for a good pair is that it has the inactive
S-boxes c and e. To identify such pairs, we sort all ciphertexts (after inverse P
permutation P ) by the 3-rd and the 5-th bytes. If we find a pair in a structure -
or several pairs - with the same values on these two bytes, we analyze this pair
further. The probability of having two equal bytes in one block is 216, while
we have six pairs in one structure - so in each structure we can find at most
one pair satisfying this condition. If we do not find such a pair, we generate
another structure. If such pair occurs, we move to the next phase - recovering a
part of the last round subkey. We look for these 8-bit parts of the 11-th round
subkey, which undergo the XOR operations after the S-boxes a, f and h. This
makes together 3× 8 = 24 key bits.
Table 14. Possibilities of using differential characteristic in the last round.
Table 14 shows the possibilities of using our differential characteristic for
individual S-boxes in the last round of the cipher. As mentioned earlier, the
S-boxes c and e are inactive (input differences are equal to zero), so they may
be used for an initial filtration (finding pairs which follow our characteristic
among all generated structures). For the S-boxes b, d and g used in the cipher
arithmetic operations make differential cryptanalysis of these blocks impossible.
We cannot find the 8-bit part of the last round subkey for these S-boxes. We are
left only with the S-boxes a, f and g. For them we can find the parts (bytes) of
the 11-th round subkey denoted here as Ka, Kf and Kh respectively. For each
of these three S-boxes we perform a typical key recovery procedure [1, 11, 15].
Using cipertexts (after inversion of permutation P ) of plaintext pairs, in which
the third and the fifth bytes are inactive (initial filtration) and using outputs
given from the differential characteristic (Table 14) we look for a candidate for
round subkeys (24 bits). For the S-boxes f and h we take into account the fact
that outputs of characteristic can be only one- or two-bit values. Therefore
for these S-boxes a number of the obtained candidate round subkeys may be
three times larger than for the S-box a. It is also possible that one of the three
S-boxes is inactive, and this does not result in rejection of the analysed pair.
We reject the analysed pair (extra filtration) if for any of three S-boxes during
the analysis we get impossible transition in the XOR profile.
The characteristic which was used (Table 13) has the probability 2−48.7. So,
for this characteristic right pairs will appear once on 248.7 generated pairs. For
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our characteristic we can generate structures with four plaintexts (quartets),
and in each such structure we have six different pairs compatible with input
of the characteristic. Hence, finding one right pair requires 248.7/6 ≈ 246.1
structures. Since, finding one right pair is not enough to recover the 24-bit part
of subkey we need more (2 or 3) right pairs. Hence, in the attack we have to
use about 248 structures. The complete algorithm of the attack in pseudo-code
form is given below.
Algorithm 1. Algorithm of the attack in the pseudo-code form:
I. We initialize a table with 224 entries for counter L of candidate keys with zeros;
II. For 248 structures:
1. We generate four plaintexts M (according to a given receipt of quartet);
2. We get ciphertexts C;
3. Each ciphertext undergoes permutation P , so let T = P (C);
4. Initial filtration. By sorting of T blocks we search for pairs equal on the third and
the fifth bytes.
5. If such pairs do not occur in the structure we generate a next structure (go to 1),
or for every pair which has this property we analyse the pair, it is for the S-boxes
a, f and h:
a. If a given S-box is inactive (output difference is zero) we go to the next S-box;
b. Extra filtration. If output difference (from T ) cannot be obtained from the S-
box for any input differences taken from the characteristic (for S-box a: 01, for
S-boxes f and h: 01, 08 or 09) then we reject the pair and go back to 5;
c. Finding candidate keys. For a given S-box, output difference (from T ) and input
differences (like in the sub-point b) we find candidate keys.
6. For every three S-boxes we concatenate the obtained candidate 8-bit keys to 24-bit
values. For every 24-bit value of key obtained in that way we increment a respective
value in the counter L.
III. We search for the maximum value in the counter L. It corresponds to the 24-bit of
correct three-byte part of 11th round subkey.
IV. If in the counter L there is no unique maximum we generate more structures (go to
1).
Based on the above pseudo-code and the previous analysis we claim that
complexity of the presented attack on the full 11-round version of PP-1 cipher
is 250 (encryption of 248 structures with four plaintexts each). The result of the
attack is 24-bits (three bytes) of the second part of 11th round subkey.
6. Conclusions
In the paper we presented a differential attack on the full 11-round 64-bit
version of PP-1 cipher. Its complexity is 250 encryptions with the cipher. It
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finds 24 bits of the last round key. In this attack we constructed a 10-round
differential characteristic which is nine times concatenation of one-round almost
iterative characteristic and ”relaxed” final characteristic (this is again similar to
the technique used for the GOST cipher [14]). Subsequently, almost iterative
one-round characteristic is combination of three different one-round iterative
characteristics. These one-round characteristics are a consequence of designing
a non-linear part of the cipher apart from linear permutation.
These iterative characteristics can be naturally concatenated for an arbitrary
number of rounds, and their probability allows conducting a similar attack on
the version of the cipher with a longer block length and consequently, a larger
number of rounds (see Table 6). In the cipher with longer blocks permutation
P is different, but preserves property of exchange of the fifth and the eighth bits
in the last S-box (see value in bold in Tables 3–5). Thanks to it, the proposed
one-round almost iterative characteristic can be applied to every version of the
cipher, with our difference transitions being used always in the last S-box. For
the cipher with a 128-bit block (22 rounds) we can concatenate our almost
iterative characteristic 20 times, for the 192-bit version (32 rounds) 30 times,
and for the 256-bit version (43 rounds) 41 times. By applying the suggested
relaxation in the last round we obtain in every above case a characteristic
which covers one round less than the full cipher. The probabilities of such
characteristics and complexities of attacks on different block length versions
are given in Table 15.
Table 15. Probabilities of characteristics of PP-1 cipher with different block lengths.
The above analysis shows that the number of rounds suggested for the struc-
ture of PP-1 block cipher in every version is insufficient for securing the cipher
from a differential attack. To achieve a security level of the cipher on which
complexity of a differential attack with the characteristic proposed in the pa-
per would be higher than that of exhaustive search, a number of rounds in the
64-bit version should be at least 12+security margin, because only 12 times
concatenation of a given characteristic has the probability (2−65) too small to
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perform an attack. Furthermore, a security margin should be at least 4, 5
rounds, because it would prevent the cipher from techniques based on relax-
ation of characteristic in the last round or adding an extra ”free” first round
(like in the attack on the full 16-rounds version on DES [1]).
In this paper we extend the attacks and the methodology of [8] to all versions
of PP-1 cipher ever proposed, and explain how this type of advanced differential
properties can be extended and exploited in practice to recover the actual keys
of all existing variants of PP-1 cipher.
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[10] Chmiel K. Grocholewska-Czury lo A., Stok losa J., Involutional Block Cipher for Limited
Resources, IEEE ”GLOBECOM” (2008) – proceedings.
[11] Misztal M., Practical differential cryptanalysis of DES reduced to 8 rounds, (in polish).
Bulletin WAT Cryptology part I, Warszawa (1999).
[12] Deamen J., Rijmen V., The Design of Rijndael, Springer-Verlag (2002).
[13] Rijmen V., Cryptanalysis and design of iterated block ciphers, PhD Thesis, October
(1997), K.U.Leuven.
[14] Seki H., Kaneko T., Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Rounds of GOST, SAC 2000,
Springer-Verlag LNCS 2012 (2001): 315.
[15] Misztal M., The S/N ratio in differential cryptanalysis of 9 rounds of DES, Journal of
Telecommunications and Information Technology (JTIT) 3 (2006): 49.
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 27/10/2021 19:21:24
U
S
Po
we
re
d 
by
 T
CP
DF
 (w
ww
.tc
pd
f.o
rg
)
